Views of the EU ETS Visualising the EU Emissions Trading System **Climate Policy Bri** Angela Köppl, Roland Mestel, Stefan Schleicher, Andreas Türk and Alexander Zeitlberger contributed to this policy brief. **April 2012** Feedbacks are highly welcome. Please contact Stefan Schleicher: Stefan.Schleicher@wifo.at, +43 (676) 591-3150 Wegener Center for Climate and Global Change at the University of Graz, Austria +43 (316) 380-8430 www.wegenercenter.at Vegener Center Austrian Institute of Economic Research WIFC +43 (1) 798-2601-0 www.wifo.at

The EU ETS after four years of the First Commitment Period

The First Commitment Period (2008-2012)	After the Supplementary Program Commitment Period (2005-2007) the EU ETS has now completed four years of the First Commitment Period (2008-2012), with one more year to go.
The CITL database	With the availability of about 90 percent of the verified emissions for 2011 we are able to make first judgements about the performance of the EU ETS in the First Commitment Period based on the four reported years including 2011.
	For the analysis only those installations who have submitted verified emissions in all four years were select from the database from the Com- munity Independent Transaction Log (CITL).
Focus of our analysis	The focus of our analysis is on net positions of installations, sectors, and countries for obtaining insights into the stringency of the allocations.
	In addition we want to visualise our results in order to get a better under- standing of the geographical and sectoral differences.
Evaluating net positions	To measure the stringency of allocations we define the following measures between allocated allowances and verified emissions:
	Net position = (Allocated allowances – Verified emissions) / Allocated emissions
	Gross long position = (Allocated allowances – Verified emissions) / Allocated emissions if (Allocated allowances – Verified emissions) > 0
	Gross short position = (Allocated allowances – Verified emissions) / Allocated emissions if (Allocated allowances – Verified emissions) < 0
	The dynamics of verified emissions

The lasting impact of the economic decline of 2009

Verified emissions for those installations which have reported over the whole period from 2008 to 2011 dropped by about 12 percent over these four years as can be seen from Figure 1.

The biggest impact for this decline came from the economic downturn in 2009. Taking also into account low winter temperatures, in particular at the end of 2011, evidence for mitigation effects remain rather weak.

Figure 1



Source: Based on CITL data of April 2012 by Stefan P. Schleicher and Alexander Zeitlberger

EU ETS Verified Emissions



The stringency of allocations

Over the First Commit- ment Period the EU ETS will remain in a long posi- tion	Looking at Figure 2, we realise that over the first four years of the First Commitment Period the EU ETS in total exhibits a long net position of 1.5 percent, the share of the difference between allocated allowances and verified emissions in relation to allocations. This result is in contrast to the endeavour of the EU Commission to set ex ante a more stringent cap compared to the Supplementary Program Commitment Period (2005-2007).
	This long net position results from gross long positions of 17.7 percent and gross short positions of 16.2 percent.
	The final fifth year of the First Commitment Period is not expected to bring the EU ETS into a short position.
Only in 2008 the EU was in a short position	Figure 2 also indicates that only in 2008 the EU ETS was short with a net position of -8.3 percent.
	The sectoral differences
Power and Heat are short, the other sectors long	A fundamental feature of the performance of the EU ETS is the fact that

the sector Heat and Power, which accounts for about 74 percent of the emissions, was short in each year whereas the remaining sectors were in a long position in each year.

Figure 3 shows that the Power and Heat sector was short by 10.3 percent accumulated over the first four years of the First Commitment Period. Remarkable is also the wide variation of the gross long and gross short positions which add up to the net position.

In contrast we realise from Figure 4 that the remaining sectors were always in a pronounced long position which accumulates over these four years up to 24.1 percent of the allocated allowances.



Figure 4



Questions that cannot be put aside

How to enhance the EU ETS?

This emerging evidence about the performance of the EU ETS in the First Commitment Period raises a number of questions that cannot be neglected without undermining the fundamentals of this mechanism:

- What options are available to enhance the EU ETS in the Second Commitment Period?
- Will a set-aside of allowances generate a credible price signal and does the allowance market react to the fundamentals?
- Is a cap-and-trade mechanism sufficient for triggering the radical technological innovations needed for a low-carbon economy?

High carbon price volatili-Two main issues about the performance of the EU ETS are the developty and non-binding allocament of European Union Allowances (EUA) prices and the fact that allocations tions of allowances are not binding. Since the beginning of the trading activities prices show a high variability. Improving the institutional The proven sensitivity of carbon prices to various endogenous and exogsetting enous influences and the resulting lack of relatively stable investment incentives for market participants are arguments that are put forward when advocating measures in order to provide an institutional setting to intervene in the carbon market and to influence the expectations of economic actors. Such measures could also lower the impacts of unpredictable shocks like the financial and economic crises and restrained growth prospects that effectively loosen the (ex ante) emissions cap. **Rethinking abatement** In order to improve the functioning of the EU ETS we reiterate the suggescosts and the need for a tions for a carbon market authority and extend them by the argument that carbon authority the concept of abatement curves is only of limited value in the context of CO₂ emission reductions where marginal abatement costs often are ambiguous and time variant. Market prices need reflect

There are reasons to presume that the observed carbon prices do not reflect the long-run fundamentals which in turn raises other concerns:

- Market prices may lose their credibility in terms of providing signals for long-term decisions. This has a particular bearing for investment decisions that have an impact on the supply and use of energy and may lead to technological carbon lock-in.
- As a consequence this may lead to wrong investment decisions in some cases with long term consequences – which create excessive costs.

The EU ETS at a crossroads

If the target of a credible long-term carbon price signal is still maintained - so far a cornerstone of EU climate policy - the EU ETS is due for major reforms.

The actions needed for enhancing the EU ETS result from a design flaw that has emerged over the recent years.

On the one hand long-term supply of the carbon market is fixed but on the other hand the demand for allowances is highly uncertain. Demand in the EU ETS is not only determined by uncertain economic conditions and variability in weather conditions, but also other EU policies, e.g. for renewables and energy efficiency, will have an impact of still unknown size.

At least three types of actions – all of which still highly controversial - need to be considered:

- Lowering the emissions cap by a set-aside of allowances which could be administered via the Auction Regulation.
- Installing a supply-response mechanism, possibly controlled by the creation of a carbon market authority, which would require a change of the EU ETS Directive.
- Stimulating radical technological change by ambitious technology policies as observed in the United States and in China.

The following pages provide further evidence about country profiles and sectoral differences based on the CITL data of April 2012.

Repairing a basic design flaw of the carbon market

the long-run fundamentals

Suggested actions

Country profiles of all sectors

Net positions in 2011

Figure 5





Net Position = (Allocated allowances - Verified emissions) / Allocated allowances Source: Based on CITL data of April 2012 by Stefan P. Schleicher and Alexander Zeitlberger



Accumulated net positions 2008 - 2011

Figure 7



Net Position = (Allocated allowances - Verified emissions) / Allocated allowances Source: Based on CITL data of April 2012 by Stefan P. Schleicher and Alexander Zeitlberger



Country profiles of the power and heat sector

EU ETS Net Positions

Net positions 2011

Figure 9



Net Position = (Allocated allowances - Verified emissions) / Allocated allowances Source: Based on CITL data of April 2012 by Stefan P. Schleicher and Alexander Zeitlberger



Accumulated net positions 2008 - 2011

Figure 11



Net Position = (Allocated allowances - Verified emissions) / Allocated allowances Source: Based on CITL data of April 2012 by Stefan P. Schleicher and Alexander Zeitlberger



Country profiles of the non-power and heat sectors

Net positions 2011

EU ETS Net Positions Non-Power and Heat 2011

Figure 13



Net Position = (Allocated allowances - Verified emissions) / Allocated allowances Source: Based on CITL data of April 2012 by Stefan P. Schleicher and Alexander Zeitlberger



Accumulated net positions 2008 - 2011

Figure 15

EU ETS Net Positions

Non-Power and Heat 2008-11



Net Position = (Allocated allowances - Verified emissions) / Allocated allowances Source: Based on CITL data of April 2012 by Stefan P. Schleicher and Alexander Zeitlberger



Net positions of the EU ETS in 2008 - 2011

Figure 17

Net nositions			Total				Pov	ver & Heat				Non-P	ower & H	eat	
as % of allocations	2008	2009	2010	2011	2008-11	2008	2009	2010	2011	2008-11	2008	2009	2010	2011	2008-11
Austria	-8.2	12.8	2.8	4.0	3.0	-16.4	8.4	-9.2	-5.9	-5.5	-1.4	16.9	13.8	13.2	10.6
Belgium	17.3	27.5	21.6	28.0	23.6	12.9	20.2	12.3	23.9	17.3	20.5	33.0	28.3	31.0	28.2
Bulgaria	0.0	33.3	11.1	31.9	19.7	0.0	26.9	-3.6	33.2	15.0	0.0	39.6	25.5	30.6	24.1
Czech Republic	5.8	15.1	14.0	14.1	12.3	6.6	14.9	13.6	14.1	12.3	-0.7	17.1	16.6	14.2	11.8
Denmark	-11.1	-6.6	-5.8	10.1	-3.3	-15.0	-13.9	-13.5	6.8	-8.9	9.2	31.0	34.0	27.2	25.4
Estonia	-16.4	9.7	-27.1	-0.4	-8.0	-16.7	9.6	-27.5	-0.4	-8.2	2.8	15.1	5.6	-1.9	5.4
Finland	0.8	6.7	-9.9	7.2	1.2	-6.4	-9.5	-30.7	-0.4	-11.8	9.0	25.5	14.7	16.1	16.3
France	5.2	12.0	16.8	31.8	16.4	-0.8	5.3	12.0	35.9	13.0	15.3	23.1	24.7	25.2	22.1
Germany	-22.1	-9.9	-13.7	-12.8	-14.6	-43.9	-31.4	-35.1	-32.7	-35.7	20.4	31.8	27.7	26.1	26.5
Hungary	-7.4	15.6	16.2	21.3	11.4	-10.1	15.4	13.1	19.7	9.5	-1.7	16.1	22.7	24.8	15.4
Ireland	-3.6	13.2	16.2	27.0	13.2	-9.0	3.6	5.6	17.0	4.3	13.6	43.5	50.2	57.1	41.3
Italy	-5.1	12.0	8.1	9.3	6.0	-9.2	6.7	5.4	6.8	2.2	1.8	20.6	12.2	12.8	11.9
Latvia	48.5	56.2	50.3	55.4	52.8	38.3	40.4	33.9	43.2	39.0	71.2	88.8	84.2	82.3	82.2
Lithuenia	12.9	18.2	15.7	27.4	18.7	24.4	23.4	4.7	31.3	21.0	-0.2	12.4	26.7	23.4	16.2
Luxembourg	15.8	12.5	9.3	17.4	13.7	17.2	5.2	2.2	20.0	11.2	14.5	19.3	16.0	14.9	16.2
Malta	4.2	10.6	13.0	10.9	9.7	4.2	10.6	13.0	10.9	9.7					
Netherlands	-7.3	1.9	-0.7	8.4	0.7	-19.4	-10.0	-14.7	-0.2	-10.9	15.7	25.8	25.7	25.6	23.3
Norway	8.2	0.2	1.5	7.2	4.2	1.3	-31.9	-35.4	-16.6	-20.7	12.0	16.4	19.9	19.1	16.9
Poland	-1.8	5.0	2.5	1.6	1.9	-2.3	2.1	0.0	0.6	0.1	1.9	23.2	17.5	7.7	12.5
Portugal	1.4	9.0	25.1	25.7	15.4	-3.7	-1.8	27.9	22.5	11.3	8.8	24.6	21.0	30.3	21.3
Romania	8.3	32.8	36.8	31.9	27.6	-6.1	16.9	22.4	13.2	11.7	28.0	54.6	56.2	57.2	49.2
Slovakia	20.2	32.9	32.0	31.5	29.2	25.8	35.2	39.4	40.0	35.1	16.5	31.4	27.0	25.7	25.2
Slovenia	-8.0	1.5	0.8	2.5	-0.8	-6.9	-1.6	-3.2	-2.6	-3.6	-12.6	13.9	17.3	23.1	10.4
Spain	-6.5	8.9	19.6	12.4	8.5	-30.3	-14.8	4.3	-14.3	-14.1	20.0	34.1	34.9	38.3	31.9
Sweden	28.2	42.9	28.7	32.1	33.0	32.7	32.3	18.3	30.3	28.4	27.3	44.9	30.6	32.4	33.8
United Kingdom	-25.6	-9.4	-8.6	1.6	-10.4	-40.8	-23.5	-22.9	-9.3	-24.0	12.2	25.8	27.5	29.0	23.6
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Total	-8.3	4.8	3.2	6.0	1.5	-19.7	-7.8	-8.9	-4.9	-10.3	13.9	29.4	26.3	26.6	24.1

Net Position = (Allocated allowances - Verified emissions) / Allocated allowances Source: Based on CITL data of April 2012 by Stefan P. Scheicher and Alexander Zeitberger